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hold-up problem 
Hold-up arises when part of the return on an agent’s relationship-specific 
investments is ex post expropriable by his trading partner. The hold-up problem 
has played an important role as a foundation of modern contract and organization 
theory, as the associated inefficiencies have justified many prominent 
organizational and contractual practices. We formally describe the main 
inefficiency hypothesis and sketch out the remedies suggested, as well as the more 
recent re-examination of the relevance of these theories.  
 
Investments are often geared towards a particular trading relationship, in which case 
the returns on them within the relationship exceed those outside it. Once such an 
investment is sunk, the investor has to share the gross returns with her trading partner. 
This problem, known as hold-up, is inherent in many bilateral exchanges. For 
instance, workers and firms often invest in firm-specific assets prior to negotiating for 
wages. Manufacturers and suppliers often customize their equipment and production 
processes to the special needs of their partners, knowing well that future 
(re)negotiation will confer part of the benefit from customization to their partners. 
Clearly, the risk of the investor being held up discourages him or her from making 
socially desirable investments.  
We first describe a simple model of hold-up and illustrate the main 
underinvestment hypothesis (see Grout, 1984, and Tirole, 1986, for the first formal 
proof). A buyer and a seller, denoted B and S, can trade quantity [0 ]q q∈ , , where 
0q > . The transaction can benefit from the seller’s (irreversible) investment. The 
investment decision is binary, {0 1}I ∈ , , with I = 1 meaning ‘invest’ and I = 0 
meaning ‘not invest’. The investment I costs the seller k⋅I, where k > 0. Given 
investment I, the buyer’s gross surplus from consuming q is vI(q) and the seller’s cost 
of delivering q is cI(q), where both vI and cI are strictly increasing with 
(0) (0) 0I Iv c= = . Let max [ ( ) ( )]I q Q I Iv q c qφ ∈= −  denote the efficient social surplus 
given S’s investment, and let Iq
∗  be the associated socially efficient level of trade. The 
net social surplus is then ( ) IW I kIφ:= − . Suppose that  
1 0kφ φ− > ,  (1) 
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so it is socially desirable for S to invest.  
A crucial assumption is that S’s investment decision, although observable to the 
parties, is not verifiable, and therefore it cannot be contracted upon. For the moment, 
assume as well that the nature of trade is sufficiently ‘inchoate’ so that the parties can 
contract on q only after S’s investment decision has been made. We model the 
negotiation of this contract à la Nash, yielding an efficient trading decision qI and 
splitting the gross surplus φI equally between the parties. The seller thus appropriates 
only a fraction (a half, in this case) of her investment return, while she bears the entire 
cost of investment, k, so her net payoff will be 1
2
( )S IU I kIφ:= − , following her 
investment. Suppose  
 1 0
1 1
2 2
kφ φ− < .  (2) 
Then, even though the investment is socially desirable, S will not invest. Hence 
underinvestment arises.  
Organizational remedies  
One interpretation of the inefficiency is the failure of the Coase Theorem. The 
parties cannot achieve the efficient outcome since the non-contractibility of S’s 
investment decision prevents them from meaningfully negotiating over that decision 
ex ante. From this perspective, the hold-up problem entails a transaction cost of 
market/bargaining mechanisms, and, as Coase (1937) suggested, the transaction cost 
may be avoided or reduced via other organizational structures. Indeed, Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979) suggested vertical integration 
as an organizational response.  
Just how the hold-up problem disappears or at least diminishes through integration 
is not clear, however, and requires a theory of how a particular ownership structure 
affects the parties’ exposure to hold up. This is precisely what Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) accomplish (see also Hart, 1995, for an excellent 
synopsis). According to them, the ownership of an asset gives the owner the right to 
determine the use of the asset that is contractually not specifiable. The parties will still 
negotiate the terms of trade (presumably to achieve an efficient outcome), but this 
residual right – and thus ownership – matters, since it determines the status quo 
payoffs of the parties in the negotiation.  
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To illustrate how the status quo payoffs may affect the incentives, consider our 
model above and suppose that either B or S can own all assets necessary for the 
vertical operations. The former type of integration is called B-integration and the 
latter type is called S-integration. Fix i-integration and fix S’s investment decision 
{0 1}I ∈ , . If they fail to agree on the trade decision, party i can unilaterally realize the 
(status quo) payoff of ( )ii Iψ  and party j ≠ i can realize the payoff of ( )
i
j Iψ . It is 
reasonable to assume that  
Assumption GHM: (i) ( ) ( )i ii j II Iψ ψ φ+ ≤ , {0 1}I ∈ , ; (ii) 1 0(1) (0)
i i
S Sψ ψ φ φ− < − ; (iii) 
(1) (0)i ii iψ ψ>  and (1) (0)
i i
j jψ ψ= , for I ≠ j.  
Assumption GHM-(i) means that the status quo is welfare dominated by efficient 
trade; (ii) means that S’s investment is specific to the relationship; and (iii) means that 
the investment improves the owner’s status quo payoff but not the non-owner’s.  
Given the assumption again that the parties split the surplus over and above the 
status quo payoffs, S’s payoff will be  
 
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
2 2 2
i i i i i i
S S I B S I S BU I I I I kI I I kIψ φ ψ ψ φ ψ ψ= + − − − = + − − .  
Hence, S’s gain from investing under i-integration is  
 1 0
1 1
(1) (0) ( )
2 2
i i i
S SU U kφ φ− = − + ∆ − ,  (3) 
where  
 (1) (0) [ (1) (0)]i i i i iS S B Bψ ψ ψ ψ∆ := − − − .   
Given Assumption GHM-(ii) and -(iii), 1 0 0
S Bφ φ− ≥ ∆ > > ∆ . Hence,  
 (1) (0) (1) (0) (1) (0) (1) (0)S S B BS S S S S SW W U U U U U U− ≥ − > − > − .   
This shows that the S-integration is the optimal ownership structure, dominating 
symmetric (non-integrated) structure, which in turn dominates B-integration structure. 
In particular, if (1) (0) 0 (1) (0)S SS S S SU U U U− > > − , then the investment is sustainable 
if and only if the seller has the asset ownership. This result reveals the main tenet of 
GHM that asset ownership can serve to reduce the owner’s exposure to hold-up.  
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Remark 1. The effects of alternative ownership structures may depend on the 
particular bargaining solution assumed. For example, the outside option bargaining 
or a Bertrand bidding solution may change the relative rankings of the alternative 
structures and may eliminate inefficiencies altogether. If the buyer’s outside option is 
binding either from the buyer’s owning more assets (that is,  B-integration) or from 
the seller being subject to competition from another seller, then the seller is forced to 
make the buyer indifferent to that option, which causes the seller to internalize the 
social return of her investment. For this reason, B-integration may perform better 
than S-integration (Chiu, 1998; De Meza and Lockwood, 1998), or competition/non-
integration may solve the hold-up problem (Bolton and Whinston, 1993; Che and 
Hausch, 1996; Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 2001; Felli and Roberts, 2001; 
MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993). 
Contractual solutions  
In the above model, the trade decision is contractible only after the investment 
decision has been made. While this assumption resonates with many real business 
situations, it is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the parties can accurately 
calculate the payoff consequences of their behaviour (Maskin and Tirole, 1999). It is 
also crucial: if the parties can contract on q prior to the investment decision, the 
underinvestment problem may be solved, without requiring the organizational 
remedies discussed above.  
To illustrate, suppose the parties sign a contract requiring them to trade qˆ  for the 
total price of tˆ . Unless renegotiated, this contract will give S a payoff of 
ˆ ˆ( )It c q kI− −  if she chooses {0 1}I ∈ , . If ˆ Iq q
∗≠ , though, both parties will be better off 
by renegotiating to implement Iq
∗ . Given the assumption again that this renegotiation 
splits the surplus equally, S’s ex ante payoff will be  
 
1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ( ) ( ) [ ( ( ) ( ))]
2
I I I IS
I q t c q v q c q kIU φ; := − + − − − .   
Hence, her net benefit from investing under this contract is  
.))ˆ()ˆ((
2
1
))ˆ()ˆ((
2
1
)(
2
1
)ˆ;0(ˆ)ˆ;1(ˆ 010101 kqcqcqvqvqUqU SS −−−−−−=− φφ                (4) 
Whether a contract like this can create a sufficient incentive for S to invest 
depends on the nature of the investment made. Suppose first that the investment is 
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selfish, so that it only decreases S’s cost but does not affect B’s valuation (that is, 
1 0( ) ( )v v⋅ = ⋅ ). In this case, the trade contract can indeed protect S’s incentive for 
investment. Observe that  
 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]c q c q v q c q v q c q φ φ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗− = − − − > − .   
By the same logic, 0 0 1 0 1 0( ) ( )c q c q φ φ
∗ ∗− < − . Since ( )Ic ⋅  is continuous, there exists qˆ
∗
 
between 0q
∗  and 1q
∗  such that 0 1 1 0ˆ ˆ( ) ( )c cq q φ φ
∗ ∗
− = − . Consequently, 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ(1 ) (0 ) (1) (0)
S S
W Wq qU U
∗ ∗
; − ; = − , so S will indeed invest whenever it is efficient to 
do so. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) show that a fixed-price contract can provide 
efficient incentives for a selfish investment by either side and, with an additional 
condition, for selfish investments by both, in a more general environment with 
continuous investment. This result implies that, as long as the investments are selfish, 
the organizational remedies mentioned above will not be necessary.  
Remark 2. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Chung (1991) have noted that 
efficiency can be achieved for investments by both sides via a contract that 
manipulates the status quo payoff of one party in the same way as above and gives the 
full bargaining power to the other party at the renegotiation stage, thus making that 
party a residual claimant of the social surplus in the marginal sense. The idea of 
contractual manipulation of bargaining powers also appears in Hart and Moore 
(1988) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995).  
Contract failure  
Contracts may not restore efficiency if the investments are not selfish. Suppose 
the investment is cooperative: 1 0( ) ( )c c⋅ = ⋅ . So, S’s investment increases B’s valuation 
only, worsening the former’s bargaining position. Such a cooperative nature of 
investments underlies many instances of the hold up problem (for example, quality-
enhancing R & D investment by a supplier and customization efforts by partners). In 
this case, any commitment to trade exacerbates rather than alleviates the investor’s 
vulnerability to hold-up. Formally, given 1 0( ) ( )c c⋅ = ⋅ , S’s ex ante payoff will be 
 
.0)0()1()(
2
1
))ˆ()ˆ((
2
1
)(
2
1
)ˆ;0(ˆ)ˆ;1(ˆ 010101 <−=−−≤−−−−=− SSSS UUkkqvqvqUqU φφφφ
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for any qˆ . In other words, no such trade contract creates more incentives for S than 
the null contract. In fact, Che and Hausch (1999) demonstrated that all feasible 
contracts are worthless if investments are cooperative.  
A similar result can be obtained if the investment is selfish, but it is difficult to 
predict the ‘type’ of trade that will benefit from the investment (Hart and Moore, 
1999; Segal, 1999). Specifically, suppose that there are n potential goods the parties 
may wish to trade but that only one of them becomes a ‘special’ type and only the 
special type will benefit from an investment. Assume that each of the n goods has an 
equal chance of becoming that special type ex post, so the parties can predict the 
special type only with probability 1/n. Adapted in our model, the surplus from trading 
the special type is φI given investment {0 1}I ∈ , , and the surplus from trading a 
‘generic’ type is φ0, regardless of the investment decision. Assume for simplicity that 
1Iq
∗ = , for I = 0,1. As the contract is renegotiable, under a contract requiring the 
parties to trade any good, S’s ex ante payoff from choosing {0 1}I ∈ , , becomes  
 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( (1)) ( (1))
2
I I IS
n n
I t c t c kIU
n n n n
φ φ φ
 
 
 
  
− −
:= − + − + − − − .   
In other words, S’s investment influences her status quo payoff only when the good 
they contracted to trade turns out to be the special type, an event that arises with 
probability 1/n. This feature weakens the ability of a contract to provide incentives, as 
can be seen from S’s gain from investing:  
 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
(1) (0) ( (1) (1)) ( ) 1 ( )
2 2
S S c c k kU U
n n n
φ φ φ φ φ φ
   
− = − + − − − − = + − − .	 
    
   
Further, as the environment becomes ‘complex’ in the sense that n →∞ , S’s 
incentive reduces to that under the null contract, thus rendering contracts virtually 
worthless.  
Several implications can be drawn from these two results. First, the contract 
failure result implies that the true challenge of the hold-up problem may lie with the 
nature of specific investments – either the ‘cooperative’ nature or the ‘unpredictability 
of investment benefit’. Second, the general failure of contracting to protect against 
hold-up lends credence and relevance to the GHM analysis of the ownership 
structures or organizational theory in general based on the hold-up problem as a 
source of inefficiency. Third, for the above results it is crucial for the parties to be 
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unable to commit not to renegotiate their contract. Were such commitment available, 
they could devise a contract that would induce them to reveal truthfully S’s 
investment decision, say, by having both parties report simultaneously about the 
decision and penalizing both of them for any inconsistency via zero trade and zero 
transfer. Then, S can easily be induced to invest by a sufficient amount of bonus given 
to her conditional only on both parties reporting ‘S has invested’. If a contract is 
renegotiable, such a costless revelation of information is impossible to achieve: 
Inconsistent reports do not reveal the identity of the liar, and both parties cannot be 
simultaneously punished, since they will renegotiate back to the Pareto frontier.  
Remark 3. Several elements are crucial for the contract failure result. First, it 
requires the existence of an opportunity to renegotiate following any contract-
specified action. If there is some non-renegotiable action, then an efficient outcome 
may be achievable. Rogerson (1984) shows that liquidated damages achieve the 
efficient outcome if a contract can be breached non-renegotiably. Likewise, if in the 
last period of renegotiation the buyer can irrevocably determine the terms of trade, 
then buyer-option contracts can overcome the hold-up problem (see Lyon and 
Rasmusen, 2004). Contract failure re-emerges, however, in the case of cooperative 
investment if the parties discount delayed exercise of the option (Wickelgren, 2007). 
Second, risk neutrality is important for contract failure. If the parties were risk 
averse, then a lottery could be used to punish both parties even in the presence of 
renegotiation, and could achieve the first-best (Maskin and Tirole, 1999). Third, it is 
important for the contract to be bilateral.  If a third party can be involved, efficiency 
can be achieved even when the contract is subject to renegotiation or collusion 
(Baliga and Sjostrom, 2005).  
Dynamics  
The basic hold-up model assumes that there is a single opportunity to invest, 
followed by the distribution of the surplus. Not too surprisingly, if the interaction is 
repeated inefficiencies can be greatly reduced, in accordance with the Folk Theorem 
for repeated games (see, for example, Klein and Leffler, 1981). More surprisingly, 
allowing for dynamic investment patterns can have a dramatic effect even in a one-
shot interaction, as shown by Che and Sákovics (2004a). When the agents can 
continue to invest even after the negotiation of the terms of trade has started, the 
 8 
anticipated investment dynamics can influence the way the parties negotiate and 
improve the incentives for investment.  
To see how this works, modify our running example by allowing S to invest in the 
following period if she has not invested in the past and no agreement has been 
reached yet. If the parties discount their future very little, S’s ‘invest’ can be sustained 
in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, hold-up still arises on the 
equilibrium path in that S receives only the fraction of the gross surplus 
commensurate with his bargaining power. Yet this does not stop S from investing. 
Suppose S does not invest today but is expected to invest tomorrow in case no 
agreement is reached today. Then, there will be more surplus to divide tomorrow than 
there is today. Since the cost of tomorrow’s investment will be borne solely by the 
investor, the prospect of the investor raising his investment tomorrow causes his 
partner to demand more to settle today. The investment dynamics thus results in a 
worse bargaining position for the party upon not investing, and creates a stronger 
incentive for investing than would be possible if such investment dynamics – that is, 
the option to invest in the future – were not allowed. As a result, investment can be 
supported in equilibrium.  
In sum, dynamics in the trading relationship and/or investment technology lessens 
either the risk of hold-up or the degree of inefficiencies caused by it. This questions 
the relevance of the hold-up problem as a rationale for organization and/or contractual 
remedies. At the same time, the presence of dynamics alters the nature of the 
incentive problems and calls for different types of contractual or organizational 
prescriptions against hold-up than those proposed based on the static models, as seen 
by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002), Che and Sákovics (2004b) and Halonen 
(2002).  
Yeon-Koo Che and József Sákovics  
See also Coase Theorem; contract theory; contract law, economics and; incomplete 
contracts; procurement. 
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